

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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USUN NEWYORK 9664

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 4710

DISTO

ALSO POUCHED TO: ADDIS ABABA, ANKARA, ATHENS, BELGRADE, BONN,  
BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, BUENOS AIRES, THE HAGUE,  
HELSINKI, ISLAMABAD, LAGOS, MEXICO, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA,  
PARIS, PRAGUE, RABAT, RANGOON, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SOFIA,  
STOCKHOLM, VIENNA, WARSAW

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM - UK, UR, JA

SUBJ: CCD: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) AT SUMMER SESSION

1. SUMMARY: SUMMER SESSION'S CONSIDERATION OF CTB WAS  
DOMINATED BY TWO EVENTS: FIRST, HOLDING OF WEEK OF  
INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH PARTICIPATION OF EXPERTS  
FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES AND SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES,  
AND SECOND, HOLDING OF SPECIAL PLENARY MEETING DEVOTED TO  
STATEMENTS BY 20 DELEGATIONS ON TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF ENTRY  
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INTO FORCE OF LIMITED TEST BAN (LTB).

(A) INFORMAL TECHNICAL MEETINGS WERE SUCCESSFUL IN SENSE  
OF BEING CCD'S MOST EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED DISCUSSION OF

VERIFICATION ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ROLE OF SEISMOLOGY, IN PAST TEN YEARS. HOPES OF SOME NON-ALIGNED TO USE MEETINGS TO EXPOSE US POSITION ON TECHNICAL TEST BAN ISSUES AS A PRETEXT TO AVOID A CTB WERE NOT REALIZED, IN PART, DUE TO SKILLFUL AND CANDID PARTICIPATION OF US EXPERTS, AND COOPERATIVE PARTICIPATION OF MEETING'S PRINCIPAL ORGANIZER, DELEGATION OF JAPAN. SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES DID NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE, BUT ATTENDED ALL SESSIONS AND MADE NO MOVES TO SHORTEN OR OTHERWISE HAMPER PROCEEDINGS.

(B) PLENARY MEETING DEVOTED TO ANNIVERSARY OF LTB WAS RATHER TAME AFFAIR. WHILE CTB ACTIVISTS LAMENTED NUCLEAR POWERS' FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE A CTB, NOTHING NEW WAS SAID AND PREDICTIONS OF HARM TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE NPT REGIME, AS A RESULT OF FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A CTB, WERE NO MORE STRIDENT THAN IN RECENT YEARS. HOPES OF SWEDEN AND A FEW OTHERS TO MAKE MEETING A PUBLIC EXTRAVAGANZA WITH ATTENDANCE OF PRESS AND HEADS OF OTHER GENEVA MISSIONS WERE THWARTED BY OUR OWN EFFORTS AND THOSE OF SEVERAL MORE MODERATE NON-ALIGNED, PARTICULARLY BRAZIL.

(C) NOTHING NEW DEVELOPED DURING SESSION ON WHETHER SOVIETS WILL REQUIRE CHINA AND FRANCE AS MANDATORY PARTIES TO A CTB. HOWEVER, SOVIETS REPEATED TO US PRIVATELY THAT QUESTION IS UNDECIDED IN MOSCOW AND MEMBERS OF SOVIET DEL FEEL THAT "UNDERGROUND", AS OPPOSED TO "COMPREHENSIVE", TEST BAN MAY BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT CHINA AND FRANCE.

(D) OVERALL SITUATION SEEMS TO US TO BE THAT MOST NON-ALIGNED AND SOME OF OUR ALLIES CONTINUE TO REGARD CTB AS MOST IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT MEASURE NOW PENDING. CTB ACTIVISTS FEEL THAT REAL CHOICE IS BETWEEN A TREATY WITHOUT ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OR NO TREATY AT ALL, AND THAT US IS INSISTING ON ON-SITES NOT BECAUSE THESE ARE NEEDED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, GIVEN PRESENT STATE OF SEISMOLOGY, BUT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO CONFIDENTIAL

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HAVE A TREATY. DELEGATIONS ALSO FEAR, AT THE SAME TIME, THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT EAGER FOR A CTB AND THAT, IF ON-SITE INSPECTION OBSTACLE WERE REMOVED, SOVIETS MIGHT INJECT NEW OBSTACLES. AS IN RECENT YEARS, THEY CONTINUE TO EXPERIENCE BASIC FRUSTRATION AS MEANS OF PUSHING US AND USSR INTO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. ATMOSPHERIC TESTING BY PRC, AND ESPECIALLY FRANCE, HAS SOMEWHAT DIFFUSED THE SPOTLIGHT ON US. MEXICAN DEL MAY TRY IN RESOLUTION AT UPCOMING UNGA TO POINT FINGER MORE EXPLICITLY AT US AND USSR AS COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR "STAGNATION" AND EXHORT US TO HALT UNDERGROUND TESTS AND NEGOTIATE TREATY. END SUMMARY.

2. INFORMAL MEETINGS, JULY 10-13. FOLLOWING POINTS SEEM MOST NOTEWORTHY:

(A) LENGTH AND CHARACTER OF MEETINGS. MEETINGS WERE LONGEST SERIES OF TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AT CCD. TWENTY EXPERTS FROM NINE COUNTRIES INCLUDING THREE NON-ALIGNED (SWEDEN, YUGOSLAVIA, EGYPT) PARTICIPATED. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS HOPED MEETINGS MIGHT BE LIMITED TO ONE OR TWO SESSIONS, THEY MADE NO MOVE TO PREVENT THEIR EXTENSION THROUGHOUT ENTIRE WEEK. WHILE CONCENTRATING ON ROLE OF SEISMOLOGY TO VERIFY CTB, MANY OTHER TECHNICAL ISSUES WERE TOUCHED UPON.

(B) LIMITS OF SEISMOLOGY. MOST EXPERTS SEEMED IN GENERAL ACCORD WITH US VIEWS RE INHERENT LIMITS OF SEISMOLOGY IN MONITORING EVENTS. US PRESENTATION FOCUSED ON ANOMALOUS EVENTS, MIXED EVENTS AND EVASION AS STILL PRESENTING DIFFICULTIES. DISCUSSIONS SERVED TO FURTHER EDUCATE POLITICAL MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS AS TO UNDERLYING TECHNICAL FACTS.

(C) DUTCH POSITION ON NEED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSILM) DUTCH EXPERT ESPOUSED GON POSITION THAT OSIS WERE NO HELP IN DETERRING CTB VIOLATIONS BECAUSE IF AN EVENT COULD BE LOCATED SUFFICIENTLY PRECISELY TO PERMIT AN OSI IT COULD ALSO BE IDENTIFIED, WHICH MEANS OSI NOT NEEDED; AND CONVERSELY, IF EVENT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BY SEISMIC MEANS IT COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY LOCATED AND THUS OSI COULD NOT BE UTILIZED. DUTCH THEORY WAS CHARACTERIZED AS CONFIDENTIAL

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"IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT" BY NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED DELOFFS, AS WELL AS SOVIETS, WHO OBVIOUSLY WISHED TO CAPITALIZE ON FACT THAT A US ALLY WAS REJECTING ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS THE USEFULNESS OF OSIS AS A DETERRENT. INFORMAL MEETINGS PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR US EXPERTS TO EXPLAIN IN EASILY UNDERSTOOD TERMS WHY DUTCH THEORY WAS NOT CORRECT, AND WE THINK OUR EXPLANATIONS HAD CONSIDERABLE IMPACT.

(D) WORKABILITY OF OSIS. SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED DELS, NOTABLY MEXICO, ASKED QUESTIONS ON WHETHER OSIS COULD BE CARRIED OUT PROMPTLY ENOUGH TO BE OF VALUE AS A DETERRENT TO VIOLATIONS. US EXPERTS EXPLAINED TYPES OF EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE SEEN DURING AN OSI AND THAT EVIDENCE WOULD PERSIST OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

(E) NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OTHER THAN SEISMOLOGY. SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED DELS ASKED WHETHER SATELLITE OBSERVATION DID NOT MAKE UP FOR ANY INADEQUACIES IN SEISMIC CAPABILITY. US EXPERTS MADE NO COMMENTS ON THIS QUESTION. EXPERTS OF JAPAN AND UK, HOWEVER, PUT FORTH OPINION THAT SATELLITE OBSERVATION, WHILE IT COULD SUPPLEMENT SEISMOLOGY, COULD NOT FILL ALL OF THE POSSIBLE GAPS.

(F) VALUE OF TESTS WITH SMALL YIELDS. SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED ASKED WHETHER TESTS OF WEAPONS WITH SMALL YIELDS, WHICH MIGHT NOT BE IDENTIFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS, WERE OF SUFFICIENT MILITARY IMPORTANCE THAT THEIR VERIFICATION SHOULD BE AN OBSTACLE TO A CTB. US EXPERTS PROVIDED GENERAL EXPLANATION, WITHIN LIMITS REQUIRED BY CLASSIFICATION, AS TO WHY TESTS OF WEAPONS WITH SMALL YIELDS COULD HAVE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ENVIRONMENT. EXPLANATIONS PRESENTED BY US EXPERTS HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED, AND HAVE BEEN PRAISED SUBSEQUENTLY BY JAPANESE AND UK DELS.

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(G) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SEISMOLOGY. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE ASKED REGARDING POSSIBLE ROLE OF MEDIUM AND SMALLER SIZED POWERS IN SEISMIC NETWORK TO MONITOR A CTB. US INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC PROGRAM WAS DESCRIBED AT LENGTH AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION. US PROGRAM AND APPROACH CLEARLY MADE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON MOST DELS.

(H) ROLE OF JAPANESE. JAPANESE DEL, WHICH WAS PRINCIPAL PROPONENT AND ORGANIZER OF MEETINGS, SEEMED TO US TO GO OUT OF ITS WAY TO COOPERATE WITH US DEL AND NOT TO HIGHLIGHT

ISSUES WHICH MIGHT HAVE POSED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE US.

(I) ABSENCE OF AGREED CONCLUSIONS. MANY NON-ALIGNED DELS HAD IN MIND UTILIZATION OF MEETINGS TO DEVELOP AGREED CONCLUSIONS ON POINTS LIKE THE ALLEGED INUTILITY OF OSIS, CONFIDENTIAL

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OR TO "STUMP" THE EXPERTS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS WHY TESTS OF VERY SMALLYIELD WEAPONS CAN HAVE VALUE. HOWEVER, NO CONCLUSIONS EMERGED FROM THE MEETINGS AND THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CCD TO THE UNGA DESCRIBES THE MEETINGS IN GENERAL BUT POSITIVE TERMS.

3. LIMITED TEST BAN ANNIVERSARY MEETING. NON-ALIGNED PROPONENTS OF MEETING INTENDED THAT IT SHOULD BE WELL-PUBLICIZED EVENT HIGHLIGHTING THAT PLEDGE CONTAINED IN LTBT TO NEGOTIATE CTB HAD NOT BEEN FULFILLED. MEETING WAS REFERRED TO IN ADVANCE AS "DAY OF MOURNING". SWEDES PROPOSED TO NON-ALIGNED THAT MEETING BE HELD ON SUNDAY, AUG 5, WITH ALL HEADS OF GENEVA MISSIONS INVITED AND PRESS TO ATTEND IN THE GALLERY. WE HEARD RUMORS IN ADVANCE OF THIS EFFORT AND ARGUED VIGOROUSLY WITH SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO CCD'S CHARACTER AS A RESPONSIBLE NEGOTIATING FORUM. CONSENSUS WAS REACHED FOR HOLDING NORMAL CCD MEETING, NOT OPEN TO PRESS, BUT DEVOTED TO STATEMENTS ON LTBT. IN THE EVENT, MEETING WAS SOMETHING OF A FIZZLE. USSR AND ITS ALLIES PRAISED LTBT AT GREAT LENGTH, AS DID US AND SOME OF ITS ALLIES. MOST NON-ALIGNED, WHILE LAMENTING ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD CTB, EXPRESSED NO NEW IDEAS. MEXICAN DEL, ALONG WITH A FEW OTHER NON-ALIGNED, WARNED THAT ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON CTB COULD ENDANGER CONTINUANCE OF NON-PROLIFERATION TRATY REGIME; HOWEVER, THIS WAS PRONOUNCED WITH RELATIVELY RESTRAINED RHETORIC.

4. PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE AND CHINA IN CTB. THIS ISSUE WAS A FAIRLY ACTIVE ONE DURING FIRST SESSION OF THIS YEAR'S CCD, AS A RESULT OF SOVIET STATEMENT AT OPENING MEETING ON FEBRUARY 20. HOWEVER, DURING SECOND SESSION, ISSUE WAS ONLY BRIEFLY RESURRECTED WHEN DUTCH STATE SECRETARY ASKED SOVIET DEL AGAIN TO CLARIFY ITS VIEWS AS TO WHETHER PRC AND FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE MANDATORY PARTIES. IN REPLY SOVIETS REFERRED TO THEIR MARCH 19 STATEMENT IN WHICH THEY SAID THAT WORK ON CTB COULD GO FORWARD WITHOUT PRC AND FRANCE, BUT WERE EVASIVE ON ULTIMATE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE PARTIES FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE. SOVIETS ORIGINALLY STATED SOMEWHAT CIRCULAR TRUISM THAT CESSATION OF TESTS CONFIDENTIAL

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"BY EVERYONE EVERYWHERE CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ALL NUCLEAR STATES BECOME PARTIES TO IT." IN SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL

CONVERSATION, SOV DEP REP (NAZARKIN) TOLD US DEPUTY (NEIDLE) THAT PARTICIPATION ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED IN MOSCOW. NAZARKIN ALSO COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT SOV DEL THOUGHT A DISTINCTION MIGHT BE DRAWN BETWEEN A "CTB", WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE PARTICIPATION BY ALL NUCLEAR POWERS, AND AN "UNDERGROUND" BAN WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE ONLY THE US, UK AND USSR. NAZARKIN SUGGESTED THAT AN "UNDERGROUND" BAN WAS BY DEFINITION NOT COMPREHENSIVE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT COVER TESTING IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS, AND IF IT WAS PARTIAL IN THIS SENSE IT MIGHT ALSO BE PARTIAL AS TO THE PARTIES ADHERING. COMMENT: WHILE SOVIET DEL'S COMMENTARY MAY SEEM TO HANG ON POINT OF SEMANTICS, IT MAY REPRESENT EFFORT BY DISARMAMENT OFFICIALS FROM MOSCOW WHO STAFF SOVIET CCD DELEGATION TO FIND RATIONALE FOR LEAVING OPEN POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING A CTB, WHEN AND IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD PERMIT THIS. END COMMENT

5. OVERALL SITUATION. NON-ALIGNED DELS THAT HAVE PUSHED CTB, AND SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES, INCLUDING CANADA, NETHERLANDS, JAPAN, CONTINUE TO REGARD CTB AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT MEASURE NOW PENDING. FRUSTRATION, HOWEVER, CONTINUES TO BE VERY HIGH SINCE DELS CAN SEE NO REALISTIC WAY OF PUSHING THE US AND THE USSR INTO CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE DELEGATIONS FEAR THAT SOVIETS MAY NOT REALLY WANT A CTB AND THAT SOVS WOULD FIND VARIOUS OBSTACLES, SUCH AS NEED FOR FRENCH AND PRC ADHERENCE, IF NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BEGAN, MAIN EFFORT OF MOST CTB ACTIVISTS IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT OSIs ARE NEITHER NEEDED NOR PRACTICAL AND, IN ANY EVENT, ARE NOT OF SUCH VALUE THAT THEY OUGHT TO HOLD UP A CTB, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT PROGRESS IN SEISMOLOGY. IT WAS HOPED BY SOME THAT INFORMAL MEETINGS WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ON-SITES ARE NO LONGER A VALID REQUIREMENT. THEY DID NOT, AND THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO NON-ALIGNED FRUSTRATION. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT NO EFFORT WAS MADE THIS YEAR BY SWEDES, COMPARABLE TO THAT OF SEVERAL YEARS AGO, TO CIRCULATE AND EXPOUND CTB TREATY ARTICLES. NON-ALIGNED REALIZE THAT MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON CTB QUESTIONS CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE UNDER LEADERSHIP OF US AND USSR. SPOTLIGHT ON US HAS HOWEVER CONFIDENTIAL

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BEEN SOMEWHAT DIFFUSED AS A RESULT OF CONTINUING ATMOSPHERIC TESTING BY PRC AND ESPECIALLY FRANCE. FOR EXAMPLE, A GREAT MANY STATEMENTS AT CCD, IN ADDITION TO LAMENTING ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS CTB, ALSO COMMENTED QUITE SHARPLY ON DISREGARD OF LTBT BY FRANCE AND PRC AND RESULTING POLLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT. FACED WITH FUNDAMENTAL FRUSTRATION, AND NO WAY TO ENSURE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, SOME DELS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE TEMPTED TO TRY TO ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF EXHORTATION AND CONDEMNATION AT THE FORTHCOMING UNGA. MEXICAN DEL HS INDICATED IN PLENARY STATEMENT THAT UNGA SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES, PRESUMABLY TO THE US

AND USSR, FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON CTB.MILLER

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